Electoral Legislation Amendment (Electoral Communications) Bill 2025 (No. 2): truth in political advertising, deepfakes and the end of the media blackout

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Electoral Legislation Amendment (Electoral Communications) Bill 2025 (No. 2): truth in political advertising, deepfakes and the end of the media blackout

The Electoral Legislation Amendment (Electoral Communications) Bill 2025 (No. 2) is a private senator's bill introduced by Senator David Pocock (Independent, ACT) on 30 July 2025. It amends four Acts to: prohibit materially inaccurate and misleading electoral matter, including deepfakes; require disclosure when electoral matter is created or modified using AI; establish an Electoral Communications Panel; and remove the 3-day broadcast media blackout before elections. The bill is before the Senate, and if passed would take effect as drafted.

This is a federal system guide. State constitutions, parliaments and local-government laws can allocate comparable functions differently.

The useful question is not only “what is the rule?” but also “who administers it, which document controls it, and when might it change?” That distinction prevents an accurate general explanation from becoming wrong advice in a particular election, chamber or policy setting.

Evidence review

The four reforms in one bill

The bill packages four distinct electoral reforms. The first — truth in political advertising — prohibits the authorisation of electoral and referendum matter that is inaccurate and misleading to a material extent. This includes material modified using digital technology, specifically deepfakes (AI-generated or manipulated video, audio or images designed to deceive).

The second reform requires electoral and referendum matter created or modified using digital technology, including AI, to carry a disclosure statement. This is a transparency measure: voters would know when they are looking at AI-generated content in a political context.

The third creates an Electoral Communications Panel — a new body established under the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 with responsibility for adjudicating complaints about misleading electoral matter. The fourth removes the 3-day broadcast media blackout that currently prohibits electoral advertising in the final days before polling day.

The bill amends four Acts: the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918, the Referendum (Machinery Provisions) Act 1984, the Broadcasting Services Act 1992 and the Special Broadcasting Service Act 1991.

Evidence review

Truth in political advertising: a long-debated reform

The question of whether political advertising should be required to be truthful has been debated in Australia for decades. Unlike consumer law — which prohibits misleading and deceptive conduct in trade and commerce — there is no equivalent prohibition on misleading political advertising at the federal level. South Australia and the ACT have truth-in-political-advertising laws, but they have been difficult to enforce.

The High Court has previously struck down attempts to regulate political advertising on constitutional grounds, finding that laws must be compatible with the implied freedom of political communication. In ACTV v Commonwealth (1992), the Court invalidated a ban on political advertising during election periods. Any truth-in-advertising law must navigate this constitutional constraint.

The bill's focus on "materially" inaccurate and misleading matter — rather than any inaccuracy — is an attempt to address the constitutional concern. A law that only targets material inaccuracies may be more proportionate than a blanket truth requirement. However, determining what is "material" in a political context — where reasonable people disagree about what matters — is itself contested.

Evidence review

Deepfakes and AI disclosure: the 2026 election context

The deepfake and AI provisions respond to a specific technological concern: the increasing ease with which convincing fake video, audio and images can be generated. A deepfake of a candidate appearing to say something they never said could be produced and distributed within minutes, reaching millions of voters before it could be fact-checked — let alone corrected.

The disclosure requirement — that AI-generated electoral matter must be labelled as such — is a transparency approach rather than a prohibition approach. It allows AI-generated content but requires the audience to be told. The effectiveness of this approach depends on whether voters notice and understand the label, and whether bad actors (including foreign state actors) comply with it.

The bill's interaction with platforms is significant. Social media companies, messaging services and broadcasters would need processes to identify and label AI-generated electoral matter — or risk liability. The practical enforcement challenges are substantial, particularly for encrypted messaging and foreign-hosted platforms.

Evidence review

The Electoral Communications Panel

The Electoral Communications Panel is a new institution. Its role would be to receive complaints about misleading electoral matter, investigate them, and presumably issue findings or orders. The panel's composition, powers, independence and funding would be specified in the bill text and are critical to its effectiveness.

A panel that is seen as independent, well-resourced and capable of making timely decisions during an election campaign could provide a meaningful accountability mechanism. A panel that lacks these attributes would add process without changing outcomes. The Australian Electoral Commission currently has limited powers to regulate the content of electoral communications — the panel would fill a gap.

The panel's relationship to the AEC, the Australian Communications and Media Authority, and existing defamation law would need to be clear. Overlapping jurisdiction creates confusion and legal risk; clear delineation is essential for a workable system.

Evidence review

Removing the media blackout

The media blackout — formally the prohibition on broadcasting electoral advertisements in the three days before polling day — has been a feature of Australian electoral law since the Broadcasting Services Act 1992 and the Special Broadcasting Service Act 1991. It applies to radio and television but not to online advertising, creating a regulatory asymmetry that has grown more significant as media consumption shifts online.

The blackout was originally justified as a "cooling-off" period to allow voters to reflect without the pressure of last-minute advertising. Critics argue it is anachronistic in the digital age, creates an uneven playing field between broadcasters and online platforms, and restricts speech without a compelling justification. Supporters argue it serves a protective function that is as relevant as ever.

Removing the blackout would mean campaigns could advertise on radio and television right up to and including polling day — as they already can online. The practical effect would be significant for older voters who rely on broadcast media, but minimal for younger voters who primarily consume election content online.

Common questions

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